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Introduction
Many countries across the world arrange for external evalua-
tion of their schools in order to inspect and improve the quality of
education. In Europe, the dominant arrangement for external
evaluations is school inspection. Inspectorates of Education assess
the quality of education in schools, using standards and procedures
to evaluate a broad range of goals related to student achievement,
teaching, the school organization and leadership (e.g. McNamara &
O’Hara, 2008). They set expectations for performance of schools,
they produce evidence as to whether these expectations have been
met and expect this evidence to stimulate and orient school
improvement.
The Dutch Inspectorate of Education, established in 1801, is one
of the oldest operating Inspectorates in Europe. Its working
methods, like those of other inspectorates, have evolved greatly
over time, particularly in the last decade (de Wolf, 2007;
Kerseboom et al., 2007). Neither the Netherlands nor the ﬁeld of
education is alone in this trend as many inspectorates in a number
of countries face comparable challenges that stem from current
policy directions (Black & Baldwin, 2010).
One of the historical hallmarks of the Dutch Education
Inspectorate, and the starting point of our analysis, is the
implementation of the Dutch Educational Supervision Act in
2003. This Act speciﬁed the framework for inspection and the
standards the Inspectorate should use in the evaluation of schools
(e.g. pedagogical climate and number of lesson hours). The act was
implemented to give the Inspectorate of Education a stronger legal
foundation for their work in schools and to increase the
transparency of their work in an era of increased autonomy of
schools.
Moreover, the act revealed that the task of the education
inspectorate was at least twofold. The inspectorate had to
guarantee that schools comply with legal requirements to ensure
the legitimacy of the received state funding. Secondly, the
inspectorate had to stimulate and challenge schools to provide a
satisfactory level of educational quality and to increase their added
value in terms of student achievement. Consequently, the
inspectorate had to combine a compliance approach rooted in
legal requirements with an approach rooted in stimulating and
challenging schools to improve.
Since the Educational Supervision Act came into force in 2003,
the political and economic situation as well as expectations toward
external inspectorates, control and accountability have changed
dramatically. Helderman and Honingh (2009) analyzed Dutch
whitepapers on regulation that had been published since 1998 and
noticed a stronger emphasis on effectiveness that could be
understood as an element of a government-wide drive to reduce
the overall administrative burden. One of the attempts to reduce
the inspection burden, which could already be found in the
Educational Supervision Act, is the notion of proportional
inspection that implies a linkage between internal and external
control and quality assurance systems. If external supervisors
could make use of internal assurance systems such as certiﬁcation,
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quality contracts and benchmarks, they would be able to arrange
for meta-supervision, auditing or other distant forms of inspec-
tions (Ambtelijke Commissie Toezicht II, 2005). In line with this
reasoning, inspectorates were encouraged and expected to apply
methods that were considered more cost efﬁcient such as risk-
analysis and risk-calculation. After the government agreed on the
use of risk-analysis in 2007 the Inspectorate of Education no longer
has to provide for full regular inspections of all schools. Instead, the
role of the Inspectorate becomes more complementary to the
mechanisms and processes the school board is required to have in
place to monitor and improve the education in their schools (e.g.
Janssens & de Wolf, 2009). As the new inspection methods should
be aligned to the explicit responsibility of school boards for the
quality of education and compliance to the legislation in their
schools (where the principal is responsible for the daily operation
of the school within the framework set by the school board), the
communication between the Inspectorate and the school is with
the school board instead of with the principal.
As some of these changes in working methods since 2003 did
not ﬁt the 2003 Supervision Act anymore, the law was amended in
2011. This change in legislation calls for a renewed description and
reevaluation of the functions and methods of the Dutch
Inspectorate of Education. Taking the reconstructed program
theory of the 2003 Dutch Supervision Act by Ehren et al. (2005) as
our starting point we will compare and contrast the then valid
assumptions of how school inspections were supposed to work and
the effects they were expected to have with the current
assumptions. For the sake of consistency we will build on methods
applied by Ehren et al. (2005) to reconstruct the program theory
and to analyze how this renewed program theory is different from
the former one. Previous work of Janssens and de Wolf (2009) and
de Wolf and Verkroost (2010), who have reconstructed assump-
tions of changes in policy on the governance and control of schools
by the Department of Education in general, will inform our analysis
in so far as they address how inspection methods (within that
context) area expected to lead to school improvement. Available
research on effects of school inspections will be used to discuss the
validity and realism of the renewed program theory in comparison
to the former one. The comparative take will help to answer the
following questions:
- How are school inspections currently expected to lead to good
education?
- How are these assumptions different from the assumptions that
were stated in 2003 and what shift in inspection paradigm can be
found?
- How are the old and new inspection paradigms different and
which paradigm is expected to be most realistic in promoting
good education?
The next section outlines the method to reconstruct and
evaluate the program theory.
Method
In this paper we will reconstruct the program theory of the
reenacted Supervision Act of 2011. A program theory is ‘an explicit
theory or model of how a program causes the intended or observed
outcomes’ (Rogers et al., 2000, p. 5). Identifying and explicating a
program theory enables us to evaluate the validity of the
assumptions and expose potential implementation and theory
failures. Implementation failures arise when intended activities are
not put into operation (Weiss, 1997); they can be identiﬁed in an ex
post evaluation when the actual implementation of the program is
evaluated in comparison to its intended implementation. In this
paper we will focus on potential theory failures and use the
reconstruction of the renewed Supervision Act as an ex ante
evaluation. Such an ex ante evaluation discusses the validity and
coherence of the assumptions and builds on previous research
ﬁndings to discuss the realism of the propositions. An ex ante
evaluation enables us to point out the potential impoverished nature
of the theory that underlies the current approach of school
inspections and the rationale for changing this approach.
As we will compare and contrast the program theory of the
reenacted Supervision Act of 2011 to the Supervision Act of 2003,
we will lean on the choices Ehren et al. (2005) made in the
reconstruction of the 2003 Supervision Act. Ehren et al. (2005)
chose a policy scientiﬁc approach to reconstruct their program
theory. A policy scientiﬁc approach is described by Leeuw (2003)
as one that is strongly linked to mainstream evaluation methods
and uses interviews, documents to reconstruct the assumptions
underlying a program; an argumentative analysis is used to
distinguish relevant statements from these documents and
interviews and rephrase them into assumptions describing causal
mechanisms. The beneﬁt of this approach is the use of evidence to
reconstruct a consistent program theory (Karstanje, 1996). Other
methods, such as a strategic assessment approach which includes
group dynamics and dialog to empower stakeholders to share
knowledge and perspectives, or the elicitation methodology
where mental models and cognitive maps of members of
organizations are extracted to explain and predict organizational
outcomes, run the risk of negotiating the informative and
empirical content of the program theory or including ideological
or politically correct statements about the content of the program
theory (Leeuw, 2003). Ehren et al. (2005, p. 61) outline the steps
that are taken when using a policy scientiﬁc approach to
reconstruct a program theory. These steps will also be taken to
analyze documents to reconstruct the program theory of the
reenacted Supervision Act of 2011:
1. Identify the social and behavioral mechanisms that are expected
to solve the problem; search formal and informal documents for
statements indicating the necessity of solving the social,
organizational, or policy problem in question, the goals of the
proposed policy or program, and how they are to be achieved.
These latter statements refer to mechanisms (or ‘‘engines’’) that
drive the policies or programs and are believed to make them
effective. Examples are manifold. They include determinants of
innovation diffusion, mechanisms underlying Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma games, processes producing social capital, cognitive disso-
nance, different types of learning behavior, and many more.
Statements having the following form are especially relevant for
detecting these mechanisms:
- It is evident that x will work.
- In our opinion, the best way to address this problem is to.
- The only way to solve this problem is to.
- Our institution’s x years of experience tell us that.
2. Compile a survey of these statements and link the mechanisms
to the goals of the program under review.
3. Reformulate the statements into conditional ‘‘if-then’’ proposi-
tions or propositions of a similar structure (e.g., ‘‘the more x, the
less y’’).
4. Search for warrants that will identify disconnects in or among
different propositions using argumentation analysis. Founded in
part on Toulmin’s (1964) The Use of Argument, argumentation
analysis refers to a model for analyzing chains of arguments and
helps to reconstruct and ‘‘ﬁll in’’ argumentations. A central
concept is the warrant, which, according to Toulmin (1958)
and Mason and Mitroff (1981), is the ‘‘because’’ part of an
argument. A warrant says that B follows from A because of a
(generally) accepted principle. For example, ‘‘the organization’s
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performance will not improve next year’’ follows from ‘‘the
performance of this organization has not improved during the
past 5 years’’ because of the principle that past performance is
the best predictor of future performance. The ‘‘because’’ part of
such an argument is often left implicit, with the consequence
that warrants must be inferred by the person performing the
analysis.
5. Reformulate these warrants in terms of conditional ‘‘if-then’’ (or
similar) propositions and draw a chart of the (mostly causal)
links.
The starting point of the reconstruction of the reenacted
Supervision Act is a whitepaper on supervision and regulation
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2005) in which principles of good
supervision and regulation were presented. This whitepaper
introduces a number of starting points for (school) inspections.
These starting points are elaborated in additional documents of
both the Department of Education and the Inspectorate of
Education, such as the ‘Governance letter’ (2005), and the policy
document ‘trustworthy inspections’ (2006). The evaluation of the
Supervision Act in 2007 outlines additional changes that lead to
the reenactment of the Supervision Act. Smeets and Verkroost
(2011) describe a time line of documents that were produced from
the implementation of the ﬁrst Supervision Act up to the
reenactment of the Supervision Act. All these documents were
analyzed according to the steps described above. We also analyzed
newsletters of the Inspectorate of Education, describing changes to
the Supervision Act and their intended outcomes, minutes of
discussions in parliament about the reenactment of the Supervi-
sion Act, the ﬁnal outline of the revisions of the Supervision Act and
the memorandum of understanding, explaining the rationale for
the reenactment of the Supervision Act. Additionally, we studied
two papers in which assumptions of the new inspection
methodology and the broader theory of action of the Department
of Education on governing and controlling schools was recon-
structed by employees of the Inspectorate of Education who were
involved in developing the new inspection methods (de Wolf and
Verkroost, 2010; Janssens and de Wolf, 2009).
The reconstruction of the program theory also included a
participant check were ﬁve employees of the Inspectorate of
Education and four policymakers of the Department of Education
were asked to indicate whether the assumptions in the recon-
struction of our program theory provide an accurate description of
the new inspection methods and their intended effects. The
participant check with Inspectorate employees included individual
exchanges, whereas a meeting with a group of four policymakers of
the Department of Education was used to discuss the validity of the
assumptions. Both employees of the Inspectorate and the
Department of Education were actively involved in outlining
changes to the Supervision Act and in designing and implementing
the risk-based school inspections; they could therefore adequately
reﬂect on the accuracy of the assumptions.
We considered a total number of nine members for the
participant check as an adequate quantity to validate our program
theory as the comments and proposed changes to the assumptions
given by these participants were overall relatively similar and
agreement was reached on the ﬁnal (revised) assumptions by the
majority of the participants. Revisions to the assumptions included
the inclusion of the four yearly school visits and the (changes in
the) publication of ﬁndings in the reconstructed theory to describe
the full range of inspection methods. Furthermore, it turned out to
be necessary to analyze a number of additional documents related
to the legislative changes of good governance in schools to
elaborate on the assumptions related to the communication to the
school boards and to be able to describe the broader context in
which the Inspectorate operates.
After reconstructing the current program theory we compared
and contrasted it to the previous one, speciﬁcally outlining changes
in functions and intended effects, inspection activities and
mechanisms. We will discuss the extent to which these changes
are expected to lead to more effective school inspections in terms
of achieving the intended goals of promoting minimum student
achievement results. Our choice of literature to evaluate these
assumptions is informed by recent scientiﬁc research on self-
regulation, polycentric steering and regulation. These concepts are
at the heart of current debates in public administration and
provide a suitable knowledge base to contrast and discuss the
program theory.
Results
This section presents the evaluation of the Supervision Act of
2003 and the recently amended Supervision Act. We start with a
description of the motives that led to the ﬁrst Supervision Act in
2003 and the reconstructed program theory of this Supervision Act
by Ehren et al. (2005). Their reconstruction describes the functions
and intended effects (1), inspection activities (2) and mechanisms
(3) that were foreseen in the ﬁrst Supervision Act. In the second
part of this section we will present our reconstruction of the
program theory of the amended Supervision Act and changes that
led to these amendments following the same approach and
structure of Ehren et al. (2005). Here, it is important to mention
that developments and adjoining legislation that led to changes in
the Supervision Act or that affect the working methods of the
Inspectorate of Education are also taken into account.
Supervision Act 2003
In the early 1990s a number of changes took place that
ultimately led to the ﬁrst Supervision Act. School inspections
became centrally structured, well outlined and publicly discussed
evaluations of schools, instead of evaluations that varied according
to the background, personal views on the role of school inspections
and agenda of every individual school inspector (Elte and Scholtes,
2001). School inspectors started to evaluate schools using
standardized frameworks, procedures and protocols. During that
period, a need was felt to include these frameworks, procedures
and protocols in new legislation to secure the position and working
methods of the Inspectorate of Education and to enhance the
transparency of their work.
1. Functions and intended effects of school inspections
In the process of developing standardized frameworks,
procedures and protocols, the Inspectorate tried to involve
different opinions and deﬁnitions of educational quality of
central and local governments and of schools (Elte, 2002).
According to Elte (2002), the Inspectorate ultimately chose to
frame its function as contributing to societal trust in public
education and to guarantee that schools deliver a satisfactory
level of educational quality for all citizens. Guaranteeing
educational quality is, according to the memorandum of
understanding of the Supervision Act, achieved primarily
through inspection of legal requirements that schools should
comply with.
According to Ehren (2006), these legal requirements were,
however, considered to be insufﬁcient for achieving the goals of
improved education. The Educational Supervision Act therefore
further speciﬁed quality standards (that partly elaborate on the
legal requirements). The Inspectorate was entitled to evaluate
these quality standards in such a manner that schools are
stimulated to provide higher standards of quality than those
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considered merely satisfactory. These quality standards repre-
sent, according to the memorandum of understanding (p. 11),
the aspects of performance of schools considered important by
the legislator. Schools were however not obliged to meet these
quality standards; they only have to comply with legal
requirements. However, schools are seen as organizations that
are willing to change and inspections of these quality standards
were therefore expected to stimulate schools to aim for high
educational quality, within their own school goals and mission.
High educational quality is deﬁned as the added value of schools
in terms of student achievement.
2. Inspection activities
The reconstructed program theory by Ehren et al. (2005)
describes three activities through which school inspections are
expected to lead to increased added value of schools: quality
assessments of legal requirements and quality standards (part of
an overall framework), the publication of ﬁndings and
proportional inspections.
Quality assessment
As Ehren et al. (2005, p. 5/6) describe, ‘‘the framework used by
the inspectorate to assess school quality integrates two types of
indicators: legal requirements and quality standards. Legal
requirements are formulated in the separate educational acts.
Schools have to meet these requirements to receive governmental
ﬁnancing. These requirements describe, for example, a number of
educational goals or state that schools should prepare their pupils
for secondary education. Quality standards, such as an adequate
pedagogical climate and supply of subject matter, are part of the
Educational Supervision Act and are intended to guide the
inspectorate in assessing schools. Schools are not obliged to meet
these criteria.’’
The Educational Supervision Act assumes that school inspectors
provide feedback to schools on their strengths and weaknesses
including suggestions on how to improve related to these quality
aspects and legal requirements. Schools assessed by inspectors as
‘failing schools’ should be visited more intensively and more
frequently than other schools, and inspectors should draw up
written agreements with these schools about the improvements
required. In this case, over and above its evaluative role, the
Inspectorate should also fulﬁll an advisory function for weaker
schools, specifying possible improvements and explaining how
things can be done differently. Schools may also be requested to
describe how they will attempt to implement the school
improvement action plan and these plans should be monitored
thereafter by the school inspector.
Publication of ﬁndings
The publication of inspection ﬁndings was, according to Ehren
et al. (2005), also expected to stimulate schools to improve. The
Inspectorate of Education publishes assessments of individual
schools in so called quality cards on the Internet. These quality
cards include an overview of how the school is doing on each
standard in the inspection framework. The extensive written
inspection report of individual schools was also published on the
Internet.
Proportional inspection
Finally, the Supervision Act arranges for proportional inspec-
tions of schools. According to Ehren et al. (2005, p. 66), the
proportional working method of inspection describes the use of
results of quality assurance and self-evaluation of schools by the
Inspectorate to form judgments about school quality. To be helpful,
the self-evaluation results of schools must be reliable and provide
information about the indicators included in the inspection
framework. If these requirements are met, the Inspectorate will
confront the schools with fewer and less intense inspection visits
and request less information from schools to inform inspection
assessments.
3. Mechanisms
The program theory of the Supervision Act, as reconstructed
by Ehren et al. (2005) speciﬁed expectations about how these
aspects of school inspections were expected to work and lead to
intended effects. Quality assurance and self-evaluation of
schools were a ﬁrst important link between proportional
inspections and increased added value of schools. The promise
of less intense and frequent inspection visits was expected to
motivate schools to engage in self-evaluation activities that
would reveal strong and weak aspects of their functioning.
Schools were expected to use these insights to improve and, as a
result, to increase their added value. The proportional inspection
method was also expected to lead to efﬁcient allocation of
inspection capacity to failing schools, where failing schools are
provided with more feedback to inform their improvement
processes. Inspection feedback was expected to be a strong
motivator for school improvement.
Finally, the publication of inspection ﬁndings was expected
to promote some kind of market mechanism where improve-
ment of schools is motivated through informed school choice
and voice of parents.
A more detailed description of the program theory of the
2003 Supervision Act can be found in Ehren et al. (2005).
Renewed Supervision Act 2011
Political and societal developments led to a change in the Dutch
Department of Education’s philosophy and theory of action on how
schools should be controlled and governed. The Dutch Educational
council (2006) describes how deregulation of educational policy,
increased autonomy and scaling up of school organizations
implied a greater need for increased professionalism of school
boards and school management. The Department of Education
(2007) considered that school autonomy and decentralization
could only succeed if school boards increased the professional
administration and governance of their schools. A number of
legislative changes were initiated to motivate school boards to
improve their governance of schools; they were required to
arrange for separate mechanisms of the administration and
internal supervision of their schools and to develop and implement
codes of conduct for good governance. As a result, the system of
horizontal checks and balances of professional schools and
governance of schools was extended.
Such a change in checks and balances in schools also implies a
change in the role for the Inspectorate of Education. External
supervision by the Inspectorate of Education should, according to
Smeets and Verkroost (2011) and Janssens and de Wolf (2009), act
complementary to these horizontal mechanisms by risk-based
selective school inspections of underperforming schools. The
Inspectorate of Education should also communicate their activities
to school boards (instead of principals) and should evaluate the
functioning of school boards.
According to the Dutch Educational Council (2006), the societal
and political need to have more efﬁcient and effective school
inspections with less administrative burden for schools also
prompted risk-based inspections. Schools that have no risks of
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failing quality are not scheduled for an inspection visit and will
experience less inspection burden.
The Educational Council (2006) and the evaluation of the
Supervision Act (Inspectorate of Education, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c,
2010d, 2010e) also point to a number of incidents where the
Inspectorate of Education did not have the authority to intervene in
systematically failing schools due to the fact that schools are not
obliged to improve their functioning on the quality standards. As a
result of these incidents, the Inspectorate of Education will be
provided with additional options to sanction schools in case of
long-term failure. These additional options should enable the
Inspectorate, according to the memorandum of understanding of
the renewed Supervision Act, to intervene more quickly and more
effectively in schools that are underperforming or that fail to
comply with legislation.
1. Functions and intended effects of school inspections
The Memorandum of understanding of the revised Supervi-
sion Act (2009, p. 9) describes how the risk-based inspection
method changes the role of the Inspectorate into one of
examiner, auditor and enforcer. The Inspectorate now assesses
whether schools meet requirements and offer a minimum
quality level; guaranteeing a satisfactory level of education is
now the central function of school inspections (Educational
Council, 2006). School inspections are expected to lead to good
education which is described in the annual working document
of the Inspectorate (2010) as ‘ensuring that all students have the
opportunity to achieve their academic potential’. The effects of
school inspections can, according to the Department of
Education (2007), be determined by looking at the percentage
of (highly) failing schools and the average assessments of
schools on the inspection standards, as well as the extent to
which schools comply with legislation and meet requirements
of ﬁnancial lawfulness. An important indicator in deﬁning a
satisfactory level of education is, according to the Educational
Council (2006), student achievement results.
2. Inspection activities
The precise nature of inspection at the level of schools varies
depending on the outcome of the initial risk-based analysis
(Department of Education, 2007). Nevertheless, the Inspectorate
of Education continues to use an inspection framework to assess
schools after the reenactment of the Supervision Act. The risk-
based school inspections are now the primary method of
implementing proportional inspections and the Inspectorate
publishes the results of these analyses on the Internet. The
description of these activities below clearly illustrates that the
working methods of the Inspectorate have changed.
Quality assessment
The Inspectorate of Education continues using an inspection
framework to assess schools after the renewal of the Supervision
Act (Inspectorate of Education, 2010a). In addition to evaluating
the quality standards and legal requirements, the Inspectorate is
also given the assignment to evaluate the quality of teaching
personnel, the quality of governance of schools and ﬁnancial
lawfulness. Additional legislation of ‘Good Education Good
Governance’ (Inspectorate of Education, 2010b) also outlines
minimum student achievement results as legal requirements
schools have to meet to prevent being sanctioned.
Proportional inspections
The Inspectorate of Education uses the method of risk-based
school inspections to evaluate schools’ performance on the
inspection framework. The Inspectorate carries out early warning
analyses, using information on possible risks of low educational
quality in schools, such as student achievement results on
standardized tests and school documents. The student achieve-
ment results are expected to predict performance of schools on all
the standards in the inspection framework (Inspectorate of
Education, 2009a). Schools with no risks are not scheduled for
inspection visits, whereas schools that show risks receive
additional inspection monitoring and interventions.
Additional monitoring includes desk research of additional
results and school documents (for example, test scores in
intermediate grades or annual reports), interviews with the school
board and potentially also inspection visits where the inspection
framework is used to assess educational quality in the school as
sufﬁcient, failing or highly underdeveloped (Inspectorate of
Education, 2009b).
Failing or highly underdeveloped schools are scheduled for
additional interventions; the school board has to formulate a plan
of approach aimed at improving quality. The inspectorate monitors
the implementation of this plan. In case the school does not
improve, sanctions may be enacted such as ofﬁcial warnings or
administrative and/or ﬁnancial sanctions (Inspectorate of Educa-
tion, 2009b).
The inspection activities and potential interventions in schools
are now communicated to the school board (instead of the
principal). Also, some of the data collection on educational quality
of schools is carried out through interviews and surveys given to
school boards (Inspectorate of Education, 2010a).
In addition, the House of Representatives of the States General
agreed in October 2007 to add a provision of four yearly visits to
the risk-based school inspections. All schools in primary and
secondary education (also high quality schools) should be visited
by the Inspectorate of Education at least once every four years.
These visits are instated to provide for a ‘reality check’ and to
prevent schools from having no inspection visit for a long period of
time (Inspectorate of Education, 2010c). The visit is however
explicitly not instated to evaluate schools on all the standards in
the inspection framework, but only on a selection of standards that
is relevant given the previous results of the early warning analysis
of the school or the agenda of the Inspectorate.
Publication of inspection ﬁndings
After the implementation of risk-based school inspections, the
Inspectorate cannot publish quality cards anymore as only a
minority of schools are evaluated on all inspection standards (only
schools with potential risks of failing). As a result, only the type of
activity/visit assigned to schools was published, as well as reports
of inspection visits of potentially failing schools, and a list of failing
and underdeveloped schools (Department of Education, 2007).
3. Mechanisms
The renewal of the Supervision Act, and the changes in
inspection methods, are expected to lead to more effective
school inspections that contribute directly to improvement of
educational quality in schools, and also indirectly stimulate
quality development of schools (see Department of Education,
2007, pp. 2–3; Inspectorate of Education, 2010d, p. 18;
Inspectorate of Education, 2010c, p. 3 and Inspectorate of
Education, 2010e, p. 19).
In particular, risk-based school inspections are expected to
increase effectiveness of school inspections by identifying
potentially low performing schools and increasing inspection
activities in these schools (and less inspection activities in well
performing schools) (Inspectorate of Education, 2010d).
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Increasing inspection activities in potentially failing schools is
expected to be more effective than using the same inspection
capacity for inspection of all schools. Inspection of potentially
failing schools should motivate these schools to quickly bring
their educational quality up to par again. The Inspectorate of
Education motivates schools to do so by instructing the school
board and the school to make necessary improvements and by
controlling the outcomes of these improvements. The Inspec-
torate also motivates failing schools to improve when
publishing their name on a list of failing schools on the
Internet. The fact that additional sanctions can be enacted also
acts as a strong impetus for change. The Inspectorate expects
failing schools to quickly improve after an inspection visit as
school boards are often not aware of the failure of their schools
or of the decline in quality of their schools. Schools and school
boards are expected to be very willing to change (Inspectorate
of Education, 2010d)
In addition, risk-based inspections are also expected to
prevent failure of schools as early identiﬁcation of potential risks
of failing quality should enable speedy interventions in these
schools that are expected to prevent a further decline in
educational quality (Inspectorate of Education, 2010a, 2010d).
Also, school boards are early on informed of potentially failing
schools and are expected to take action to improve their schools.
The fact that they are required to send in information on the
quality of their schools should also motivate them to stay
informed on the quality of their schools and to keep working on
potential improvements (de Wolf and Verkroost, 2010; Janssens
and de Wolf, 2009).
These mechanisms are expected to guarantee a minimum
level of quality (in terms of student achievement levels) in
schools. Stimulating broader quality development of schools is
expected to be taken up by school boards, internal supervisors
and stakeholders of the school (see Department of Education,
2007, pp. 2–3; Inspectorate of Education, 2010c, p. 3 and
Inspectorate of Education, 2010e, p. 19; Inspectorate of
Education, 2010d, p. 18). They are expected to use benchmark
information, provided by the Inspectorate, to effectively exert an
inﬂuence on the strategic choices of schools and motivate
improvement of schools (Inspectorate of Education, 2010a). A
detailed description of the assumptions can be found in
Appendix.
Analysis
Bringing together the functions and intentions, inspection
activities and mechanisms as presented in the results section in
Table 1 helps to identify and analyze the changes as well as to
summarize the results. With regard to the functions and intended
effects we note two shifts. First of all, a minimum level of
educational quality is now deﬁned in terms of (minimum) student
achievement levels whereas this deﬁnition used to focus primarily
on compliance of schools with legal requirements. Secondly,
stimulating broad quality development is no longer considered to
be a task of the Inspectorate of Education, but of school boards,
internal supervisors and stakeholders of the school. The Inspec-
torate should support this function by providing these actors with
benchmark information on the school.
The choice of focusing on the guaranteeing function of the
Inspectorate instead of stimulating educational quality is
prompted by the fact that school inspectors were put into the
role of educational advisors where they eventually had to evaluate
the outcome of their own advice (Memorandum of Understanding,
2009). This double role was considered to be incompatible with the
notion of independent assessment and evaluation.
Looking at the inspection activities, the two most prominent
changes are risk-based school inspections and communication of
inspection activities to/with school boards (Inspectorate of
Education, 2007). In their essay on ‘selective and effective school
inspections’, Smeets and Verkroost (2011) argue how risk-based
school inspections are in fact a further elaboration of the idea of
proportional inspections as originally described in the Supervision
Act. Smeets and Verkroost (2011) state that the self-evaluation
results of schools limitedly met the reliability and validity criteria
in the Supervision Act. As a consequence proportional inspection
led only to some variation in the intensity of inspection visits that
ranged from short yearly visits to extensive two day visits once
every four years. In the amended Supervision Act, risk-based
school inspections are included to foresee an actual variation in
frequency of school inspections, in addition to a variation in
intensity of school inspections. Well-performing schools are, in the
arrangement of risk-based school inspections, not visited. Also,
student achievement results are now (in addition to signals, yearly
documents and complaints of parents) the central indicator to
inform proportional inspections, instead of the quality assurance
and self-evaluation results of schools.
The communication of inspection activities to/with school
boards aligns with the new philosophy of good governance where
school boards are considered the primary actors in governing the
quality of their schools and where additional legislative changes
require school boards to have an internal supervisory board in
place and to provide an account to stakeholders (Inspectorate of
Education, 2009a).
With regard to the mechanisms that can be found in Table 1 it
becomes clear that the mechanisms the Inspectorate relies on
depend largely on the outcome of the risk-analysis. Schools that
perform well are considered to be affected indirectly by the
Inspectorate and directly by other stakeholders or mechanisms,
whereas weaker schools can count on direct motivators and
involvement of the Inspectorate. In the ‘old’ Supervision Act, the
Inspectorate of Education was more directly involved in improve-
ment of all schools through regular visits and feedback on potential
improvement in all schools.
Conclusion and discussion
Assumptions underlying inspection methods, inspection para-
digms and their contribution to promote good education are at the
heart of this paper. The assumptions underlying the Dutch
Education Supervision Act were taken as a point of reference to
examine the differences in assumptions between the current
amended Supervision Act and the former one. The analysis already
showed a number of transformations in the underlying assump-
tions as well as in the working methods of the Inspectorate. In this
section we reﬂect once more on the major shifts that have been
made over the last decade with the help of theoretical notions and
by indicating whether the changes that have been made offer
promising anchor points to the much-wanted educational
improvement.
The transformations that become clear from the analysis can in
a more abstract sense be presented as a shift from a primarily
monocentric form of quality development steering with a broad
range of indicators related to educational processes and school
outputs, to a more polycentric type of steering with a larger focus
on output and performance of schools.
A monocentric form of steering is described by Teisman (1992)
as the idea that national government is the central actor in deﬁning
and designing society and in deciding on how to tackle societal
issues. In a monocentric form of steering, national government
focuses on governing ‘throughput’ of organizations, such as
educational and ﬁnancial/organizational processes in schools
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(Bekkers, 2009). Through instructions, norms, policy guidelines,
monitoring, control and inspections, national government tries to
inﬂuence these processes.
The ﬁrst version of the Supervision Act in 2003 is highly
inspired by this type of monocentric steering. The Act contains a
multitude of indicators on throughput of schools, and the
Inspectorate of Education (as a representative of the national
government) is the primary organization in monitoring schools’
functioning on these indicators. The feedback of school inspectors
during inspection visits and the requirements on using self-
evaluations of schools as part of school inspections are one of the
primary central steering mechanisms in governing throughput of
schools.
The reenacted Supervision Act of 2011 highlights a more
polycentric form of steering where central government (and the
Inspectorate of Education) is only one of the actors in governing
schools. Steering takes place in a context of interdependent
networks of different actors (Teisman, 1992) who use knowledge,
information and other resources to inﬂuence schools. According to
Bekkers (2009), in a polycentric steering arrangement, central
government builds on available steering capacity in organizations
and in the ﬁeld to perform some kind of meta-steering and
network management. This meta-steering may include the setting
of performance indicators of school outputs, instating incentives
(such as sanctions) to meet these indicators and structuring
relations between different actors in and stakeholders of orga-
nizations. The indicators on minimum student achievement results
schools must meet and the requirements (laid down in additional
legislation of ‘Good Education Good Governance’) for schools to
have an internal advisory board and deﬁne codes of good
governance ﬁt this type of polycentric meta-steering and network
management. The Inspectorate is explicitly placed in this network
of polycentric steering when, for example, reducing its role to only
guaranteeing minimum educational quality in terms of student
achievement in schools, and providing benchmark information to
actors in the network around schools.
This change in steering paradigm is expected to increase the
effectiveness of school inspections as inspection capacity can be
allocated to potentially failing schools and early identiﬁcation of
potentially failing schools should prevent failure of schools. In this
section we ask ourselves whether this change in paradigm is
actually effective in promoting school improvement.
A ﬁrst reﬂection in this respect includes a discussion of how the
Inspectorate of Education implements risk analyses to identify
schools in need of improvement. Risk-based inspections have been
implemented in a wide range of Western countries to manage
social problems and potentially dangerous situations (see Black
and Baldwin, 2010; Honingh and Helderman, 2010). To identify
risks, potential dangers and problems, a wide variety of
frameworks have been developed. Risk-analysis frameworks
generally include two types of risks (Black and Baldwin, 2010).
Firstly, there are inherent risks that arise from the nature of the
business’s activities. Secondly, there are management and control
risks including compliance records. The above deﬁnitions illustrate
that a risk-analysis can be seen as an indicator of the reliability of
an internal control or quality assurance system.
These deﬁnitions reveal that the Dutch Inspectorate of
Education applies the term risk-analysis in a somewhat deviant
and less effective way. To determine whether a school is
potentially at risk (a weak school), the school outcome (measured
Table 1
Comparison of Supervision Act 2003 and 2011.
Supervision Act 2003 Amended Supervision Act 2011
Functions and intended effects Guaranteeing quality in terms of compliance with legal
requirements
Guaranteeing quality (primarily) in terms of minimum
student achievement results
Stimulating improvement of schools’ functioning on quality
aspects and added value of schools (in terms of student
achievement)
Stimulating improved education through providing
benchmark information
Inspection activities Quality assessment based on legal requirements and
quality aspects
Quality assessment through an evaluation of the legal
requirements and quality aspects, the quality of teaching
personnel, the quality of governance of schools and
ﬁnancial lawfulness. Minimum student achievements are
outlined as legal requirements
Proportional inspection; using results of quality assurance
and self-evaluation to judge schools’ quality and determine
the reliability of the self-evaluations. Reliable self-
evaluation might lead to fewer and less intense inspection
visits
Risk-based school inspection based on student
achievement results, self- evaluation reports, ﬁnancial
reports, complaints of parents and media items to
determine whether inspection visits and research are
necessary.
Reality check; a four yearly school-visit to validate the risk-
based inspection methodology and allocated inspection
activity
Publication of inspection ﬁndings of individual schools’
functioning on the inspection framework in ‘quality cards’
and inspection reports on the Internet
Publication of inspection arrangement attributed to
schools, a list of failing and underdeveloped schools
Mechanisms The promise of less intense and frequent inspection visits
motivates schools to engage in quality assurance and self-
evaluation which should in turn lead to increased added
value.
Through communication of inspection activities, outcomes
and interventions to school boards of failing schools, school
improvement is stimulated.
Direct feedback on weak and strong points of schools would
lead to improvements.
Preventing failure of schools through early identiﬁcation of
potentially failing schools
Proportional inspection would lead to an efﬁcient allocation
of inspection capacity to weak schools
Risk-based inspections are expected to increase the
effectiveness of school inspections by identifying
potentially failing schools and increasing inspection
activities in these schools (including increased monitoring,
instruction to school boards and potential sanctioning of
schools)
Publication of inspection ﬁnding was expected to stimulate
well-informed school choice and voice of parents
Publication of a list of weak schools should motivate
schools to improve
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through pupils’ achievement results) is considered to be a risk-
indicator. This focus on achievements contrasts with one of the
basic ideas of risk analyses to offer warnings, information about
potential shortcomings, instability and direct causes of failures
(e.g. Honingh & Helderman, 2010). The choice of student
achievement results as the primary risk indicator implies an
identiﬁcation of schools that are already failing. Inadequate
teaching and leadership in these schools have led to low student
achievement (and not the other way around). Warnings to prevent
such failings however need to identify schools before their student
achievement results are below average. For example, indicators on
internal quality control, self-evaluations, quality of educational
processes or other causes of failure (such as substantive changes in
student or teacher population) are more suitable to provide such
warnings. Such a risk-analysis is better able to actually prevent
failing schools and to stimulate learning and the implementation
of improvements. Now that the Inspectorate focuses on outcomes,
the incentive to improve seems to be less direct and the
instruments to prevent schools from becoming a failing school
are not present.
Moreover, the change toward a polycentric paradigm is
expected to activate other actors to motivate school improvement.
Schools should be stimulated to improve on a broad range of
indicators through their functioning in a network of actors and
arrangements. The major underpinning assumption of such a type
of steering seems to be that the accountability and education
system has reached a new level of maturity where performance
improvement no longer needs to be driven from top down. Instead,
school leaders and teachers are expected to have the will and the
means to improve education on their own.
Evidence of low evaluation and change capacity of schools
however leads us to question whether the current Dutch education
system has reached the maturity level that is needed to effectively
implement a polycentric steering approach. The annual reports of
the Inspectorate of Education and Hooge en Honingh’s (2011)
report on governance in primary schools show that only a limited
number of schools and school boards have implemented struc-
tured quality assurance systems; also school boards primarily
focus on personnel and ﬁnancial matters instead of educational
quality in schools.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the fact that the focus on student
achievement results as the primary indicator in the risk-analysis
implies a move toward a more test-based accountability system.
Evidence from the U.S., where test-based accountability is the
dominant form of accountability, points to strategic behavior of
schools related to measures of student achievement. Koretz (2003)
describes different types of undesirable test preparation where
schools take classroom time away from important aspects of the
curriculum that are not represented in the test (for example,
because they are difﬁcult to assess in a multiple choice test
format). Teachers were also found to coach pupils to do better by
focusing instruction on incidental aspects of the test (such as item
format) or spending large amounts of class time on test-taking
instruction instead of regular teaching. Because instruction is
focused on incidental features, learning about them does not
produce real improvements in pupil’s knowledge of a certain
subject. Undesirable test preparation therefore leads to increased
test scores that neither generalize to a second test nor represent
meaningful increases in pupils’ knowledge of a certain domain
(test inﬂation) (Koretz, 2002).
These critical remarks indicate that the new paradigm of risk-
based school inspections in a polycentric context of governance of
schools is expected to be less effective than the previous paradigm
of inspection visits and feedback to all schools. Potential
effectiveness of school inspections is highly dependent on
activities of stakeholders in and around the school (such as
school boards and internal supervisors), and these stakeholders
have so far not taken up their role of controlling and improving
educational quality of schools. Additional arrangements, such as
support and incentives, seem to be necessary to motivate these
stakeholders to stimulate school improvement. Also, using
primarily student achievement results to identify potentially
failing schools will not enable these stakeholders, or the
Inspectorate of Education, to take timely action to prevent failure
of schools.
Appendix A. Summary of assumptions
See Tables A1–A4.
Table A1
Assumptions on risk-based school inspections.
1. If the Inspectorate of Education uses risk-based school inspections, schools will (eventually) offer good education.
1.1. If the Inspectorate of Education uses risk-based school inspections, good schools will be inspected less often, whereas failing schools are inspected
more often.
1.2. If good schools are inspected less often, they will experience more freedom to make decisions on their own education.
Because: schools have autonomy to make decisions on how to organize their education, using their own professional insights (the Department of Education only
decides on the outcomes they should achieve).
Because: administrating and controlling schools are closely connected. Schools will experience more freedom if they are controlled less often.
1.3. If good schools experience more freedom to make decisions on their own education, they will use this freedom to (maintain or) offer good education.
Because: these schools have shown to be capable of providing good education; they can be trusted to make decisions on their education.
1.1. If the Inspectorate of Education uses risk-based school inspections, failing schools are inspected more often.
1.2. If failing schools are inspected more often, they will improve more quickly.
Because: the Inspectorate instructs the school boards of these schools to improve failing indicators within a speciﬁed time frame. The Inspectorate also checks
the results of these improvements. Schools are motivated to improve through publication of their name on a public list of failing schools and the
potential threat of sanctions.
Because: in most cases schools will improve when the Inspectorate addresses potential shortcomings to the school board and makes agreements on potential
improvements. School boards often are not aware of the failure of their schools or of the decline in quality of their schools.
1.3. If failing schools improve, they will offer good education.
1.1. If the Inspectorate of Education uses risk-based school inspections, failing schools are inspected more often.
1.2. If failing schools are inspected more often, the Inspectorate will intervene sooner when quality in these schools is declining.
1.3. If the Inspectorate intervenes sooner when quality of schools is declining, the Inspectorate or school boards will prevent these schools from becoming failing
or underdeveloped.
Because: in most cases schools will improve when the Inspectorate addresses potential shortcomings to the school board and makes agreements on potential
improvements. School boards are often not aware of the failure of their schools or of the decline in quality of their schools.
1.4. If the Inspectorate or school boards prevent schools from becoming failing or underdeveloped, schools will continue to provide good education.
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Table A2
Assumptions on communication to school boards.
2. If the Inspectorate of Education addresses inspection activities to school boards, schools will provide good education.
2.1. If the Inspectorate of Education addresses inspection activities to school boards, school boards will improve their governance of schools (through
implementing quality assurance, separate mechanisms for administration and internal supervision of schools and accountability to stakeholders).
Because: the Inspectorate forces school boards to provide information about the quality of their school; they need a quality assurance system to provide
this information.
Because: changes in legislation oblige school boards to improve their governance of schools.
2.2. If school boards improve their governance of schools, they will take measures to prevent their schools from failing.
Because: good governance of schools includes school boards’ implementing quality assurance of schools, separating administration and internal supervision
of schools and accountability to stakeholders.
Because: internal supervisors will use governmental regulations, inspection standards and information to control school boards.
2.3. If school boards take measures to prevent their schools from failing, these schools will provide good education.
2.3. If school boards improve their governance of schools, they will identify failing schools at an early stage.
2.4. If school boards identify failing schools at an early stage, they will take action to make sure these schools improve.
2.5. If school boards take action to make sure failing schools improve, these schools will (ultimately) provide good education.
Table A3
Assumptions on four yearly visits.
3. If all schools are visited at least once every four years, schools will provide good education.
3.1. If all schools are visited at least once every four years, the Inspectorate will have a reality check on the quality of education in schools and will prevent s
chools from having no inspection visit for a long period of time.
3.2. If the Inspectorate provides for a reality check on the quality of education in schools and prevents schools from having no inspection visit for a long period
of time, schools will provide good education.
Table A4
Assumptions on publication of inspection information.
4. If the Inspectorate of Education publishes information about quality of schools, schools will provide good education.
4.1. If the Inspectorate of Education publishes information about quality of schools, internal supervisors, stakeholders and school boards will use this information
(e.g. to monitor and control schools, to choose schools or to motivate schools to improve).
4.2. If internal supervisors, stakeholders and school boards use the inspection information, schools will be motivated to improve.
4.3. If schools are motivated to improve, they will provide for good education.
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